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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                        
No. 02-2757
                        
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
   v.
JEFFREY DAVID WASHINGTON
a/k/a
Kenny Don Cotts
                 Jeffrey Washington,
                                  Appellant
                         
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 01-cr-00231)
District Judge:  Honorable William J. Nealon
                        
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 25, 2004
Before:  RENDELL, BARRY and FISHER, Circuit Judges
(Filed June 2, 2004)
__________
OPINION
__________
    1Washington has also made a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, which we will not
decide, based on our practice of deciding such issues on a petition for relief under habeas
corpus, rather than on direct appeal.  United States v. Jake, 281 F.3d 123, 132 n. 7 (3d
Cir. 2002).
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Jeffrey David Washington pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute
cocaine base and was sentenced to 262 months’ imprisonment.   He complains that the
District Court should have permitted him to withdraw his guilty plea, based on
ineffectiveness of counsel and lack of voluntariness.   He also urges that the government
breached the plea agreement in pressing for a sentence higher than had been agreed
upon.1
The government urges that he is foreclosed from challenging his plea on appeal
based upon his waiver of that right as part of his plea agreement.  Accordingly, it has
moved to dismiss the appeal.   We will grant this motion.
Washington’s plea agreement provided that:
[t]he defendant is aware that Title 18, United States Code,
Section 3742 affords a defendant the right to appeal the
sentence imposed.  Acknowledging all of this, the defendant
knowingly waives the right to appeal any sentence imposed
within the statutory maximum, or the manner in which that
sentence was determined, on the grounds set forth in Title 18,
United States Code, Section 3742, or any other grounds.  The
defendant also waives the defendant’s right to challenge any
sentence or the manner in which the sentence was determined
- 3 -
in any collateral proceeding, including but not limited to a
motion brought under Title 18, United States Code, Section
2255.
 
In addition, Washington also signed a document entitled Statement of Defendant, which
states: “I further understand that as a part of the plea agreement, I am waiving my right to
appeal and/or challenge my conviction and sentence, and the manner in which it was
imposed.”
We have held that waivers of appeals in plea agreements are valid if entered into
knowingly and voluntarily.  United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 2001). 
Here, the District Court specifically questioned Washington’s understanding of his
waiver.  The Court asked:  if he had signed, read and understood the plea agreement; if
he had discussed it with his counsel; if he had had enough time to discuss it with his
counsel; if his counsel had explained everything in it; and, if everything in it was true and
correct.  Washington replied, “Yes.”  The Court then explained the effect of the waiver
on his rights to appeal and to collaterally attack the proceedings and the sentence
imposed, and asked whether he understood of all this.  Again, Washington replied,
“Yes.”  The Court concluded, on the basis of this thorough colloquy, that Washington
had waived his rights of appeal knowingly and voluntarily.  We agree.  Thus, the waiver
is valid, and divests us of jurisdiction over Washington’s appeal.  Id. at 563. 
Accordingly, we will dismiss his appeal.
